# 1AC Anime

This case was not very good but I wrote it in half an hour when I saw Wesley Hu was judging me. It was one of the more fun cases I wrote.

## 1AC

### Part 1

#### **WE BEGIN WITH A STORY. Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind, a princess in a society powered by titular wind farms, has just discovered the Tolmekian—human—God Warrior, symbolic of a nuclear blast. A nuclear blast that Hayao Miyazaki regards as the inevitable outcome of our overreliance on technological domination of nature. But the God Warrior is defeated by the Ohmu, symbolizing nature’s wrath. The Ohmu go too far, however. On the verge of the Ohmu’s destruction of all Nausicaä holds dear, she must convince her fellows to understand nature, its wrath, and our essential relationship to it. It is the Ohmu and Nausicaä’s focus on understanding the importance of our relationship with the environment that I identify myself—ourselves—with. We’ve lost track of the mythic commons, the land and sky through which Nausicaä treks and soars.**

Morgan 15 [Creatures in Crisis: Apocalyptic Environmental Visions in Miyazaki's Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind and Princess Mononoke Author(s): Gwendolyn Morgan (Le Moyne College) Source: Resilience: A Journal of the Environmental Humanities, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall 2015), pp. 172-183 Published by: University of Nebraska Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5250/resilience.2.3.0172]

These two levels of fear ultimately serve to lead us to the question, What is our role with nature? Are we stewards or lords? In Nausicaä and in Princess Mononoke, the message that Miyazaki provides is that with mutual dependence comes mutual destruction. We are connected to nature, and what we do affects everything down the environmental chain. Nausicaä’s grandmother says, “The anger of the Ohmu is the anger of the earth. Of what use is surviving, relying on a thing like that?”16 What Nausicaä’s grandmother is describing is the ancient God Warrior. Fear of the Ohmu and misunderstanding the Toxic Forest and the renewal that was occurring underneath were the driving factors in awakening this apocalyptic force. The people’s dependence on the an- cient God Warrior signified a return to a life that previously ended in destruction. The ancient God Warrior is symbolic of an atomic bomb and power over nature. Napier argues, “It is a wake-up call to human beings in a time of environmental and spiritual crisis that attempts to provoke the audience into realizing how much they’ve already lost and how much they stand to lose.”17 Systematic structures broke down when the ancient God Warrior was awakened. In this postapocalyptic land- scape, we see humans, especially the warring tribes, taking the role of lords over nature. In Princess Mononoke most characters, except for San, try to dominate nature. They are controlling it through farming, mining, deforestation, and killing of the forest gods. Similar to the an- cient God Warrior in size, the Shishigami is a natural apocalyptic force. It is through the human characters’ mistakes that Miyazaki is calling into question our relationship with nature; separation and being at war with nature ends in disaster in both films.

#### And, this anime is useful at communicating the need to rework our philosophical concepts, to connect with the traditions of the past and alter our subjective positions to be more open, more available, and more authentic.

Rifa-Valls 11 [Rifa-Valls, Montserrat. “Postwar Princesses, Young Apprentices, and a Little Fish-Girl: Reading Subjectivities in Hayao Miyazaki’s Tales of Fantasy.” *Visual Arts Research*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Winter 2011), pp. 88-100 Published by: University of Illinois Press. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/visuartsrese.37.2.0088>]

In Histoire(s) du cinema (1988), Jean-Luc Godard states that “a film is a girl and a gun”3 and narrates the construction of the Western gaze by linking the identity, corporeity, and sexuality of women/girls with those of men as war heroes in Hollywood films. Nausicaä, a heroine in permanent action and expert in the arts of flying,4 responds visually to the problems set out by Godard; she alters the correlation between possession and shooting, and embodies the mission of Miyazaki’s princesses to preserve a world where the end does not justify the means. Nausicaä takes the idea of the leading role of the wind from Earthsea (1964), by Ursula K. Le Guin,5 and approaches the resolution of a global conflict by connecting with the tradition of warrior women in literature. For our viewing, I selected the scene that reveals that the role traditionally given to the man in the legend told in the tapestry and spoken by Grandma—the prophetess of doom—corresponding to Nausicaä, a woman. is scene reminded me of the importance of who is “looking,” like in the flashback that recalls the Japanese legend of the Princess Who Loved Insects (1271). During this viewing, Jana fixed her gaze on the scene in which Nausicaä listens to the sound of the bubbles flowing within the tree, which made me understand why “this film is said to be an antiwar film, a pro-ecological film, a feminist film and even a political film” (McCarthy, 2002, p. 89). In Miyazaki’s films, there are multiple subjective positions available for women/girls, who defend causes, do jobs, govern microterritories, and form social communities: Kushana is the warrior princess of the kingdom of Tolmekia (Nausicaä); women forge iron as commanded by Eboshi, who takes on San, the wolf-girl (Princess Mono- noke, 1997); Sheeta becomes a traveler and applies the spells passed on to her by her caregiver, while Dola is a pirate-mother (Castle in the Sky); they build an airplane designed by the young girl Fio Piccolo, in a story where there is also a female singer (Porco Rosso, 1992); Kiki learns to be a witch and earns her living as a messenger (Kiki’s Delivery Service, 1989); they run and clean the bathhouse (Spirited Away); they are hat-makers like Sophie (Howl’s Moving Castle, 2004); and they work in an old people’s home, like Lisa (Ponyo). In these stories, work and power relations generate exchange, fairness, and opportunity—far from the difficulties, impossibilities, and alienations of post-Fordian capitalism. In Mononoke, we can see the subtleties of the characters who evolve and are rather unconventional: Lady Eboshi, on the surface, would appear to be the villain of the story—after all, she is destroying the forest and is actively aggressive. But she also uses her position to help find employment for lepers, a maligned part of the society, and also prostitutes whom she has saved from the brothels. These women provide further examples of earthy, working-class women in Miyazaki’s films—spirited, capable individuals full of ribaldry and spunk. And then there’s San, Princess Mononoke herself. . . . She’s a wild free-spirit, a cross between Kipling’s Mowgli and Boudica. Her hatred of all humankind, which she sees as destructive of the forest and the natural order of things, has seen her reject any notion that she is human at all. She is the “daughter” of Moro [the female wolf ] and has nothing but contempt for her own race. (Odell & Le Blanc, 2009, pp. 110–111)

#### We today are Tolmekians—we cling to nuclear power to solve our problems, we refuse to understand the importance of our relationship with nature, and we fail quite miserably at trying to break from the false conception of fairness, morality, and value that structures our society.

#### The Tolmekians cared not for the people of Nausicaä’s valley—we today refuse to grieve for Native American lives lost to nuclear power. **What else shall we do—shall we start a Ceramic War? Or shall we return to the wind, to the waves, to the valley?**

#### The shock wrought by the disruption of our subjective positions through an aesthetic performance enacts a negative dialectic, a reworking of our subjectivities that avoids the deleterious effects of contemporary culture.

Carroll 8 [Carroll, Jerome (Department of German, University of Nottingham). “The Limits of the Sublime, the Sublime of Limits: Hermeneutics as a Critique of the Postmodern Sublime.” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 66.2 (2008): 171–181. // WWXR 2016-7-30]

Like Lyotard’s, Adorno’s ideas are characterized by an ambivalent attitude toward the human subject, albeit that in Adorno’s case this very ambivalence is consciously central to the political force of his thinking about art. Well known for his disparaging assessments of the manipulated mind, Adorno associates the artistic sublime with a rejection of humanism in favor of art that articulates its own “inhumanity.”36 But at the same time he is unwilling to relinquish the sovereignty or freedom of the individual as a locus of political action. Emblematic of this is the sense in which his sublime aesthetics does not preclude but rather depends on art’s cognitive impact. His references to an aesthetics of shock in the discussion of the sublime in Aësthetische Theorie suggest a similar suspension of the cognitive faculties that Lyotard celebrates, but his remark about the recipient’s “utmost concentration” suggests otherwise. In this respect, precisely in this difficult aesthetic experience, the reflective individual remains pivotal to the possibility of “glimps[ing] beyond the prison that itself is.”37 Adorno insists that the “liquidation of the I” that this experience of shock precipitates arrests the usual habits of subjectivity in a way that is the subject’s saving grace: for Adorno this liquidation is precisely the opposite of the culture industry’s “weakening of the I.”38 Insofar as sublime art is associated with a defamiliarizing renewal of habits of representing and seeing, the self is acknowledged as the necessary starting point of looking beyond its own limited and self-centered perspective. At the same time, the fact that Adorno himself refers to the art object’s “inhumanity” is indicative of the fact that he thinks we should avoid giving too much weight to the human, cognitive effects of art. Simply enlisting his sublime to an aesthetics of consciousness raising, which is not the same thing as the “most progressive consciousness” of social and artistic antagonisms that Adorno celebrates in some artworks, would be to ignore Adorno’s warning in Minima Moralia that any approach to the world that turns everything into knowledge about the self and how it relates to the world, that makes man the “measure of all things,” sees [hu]man[s] “from the first as an object.”39 This misgiving about reducing man to the status of an object reiterates the fact that the subject and its cognitive freedom are still at stake for Adorno, albeit that this freedom depends on acknowledging the (particularly aesthetic) object’s inherent indeterminacy. In this respect Martin Jay identifies Adorno’s refusal “to short-circuit a negative dialectic that pre- served some distinction between the [subject and object].”40 But implicit in the idea of a paradigm shift to an inter-subjective or communicative model of aesthetics is that the converse is also true: to develop Jay’s metaphor, alongside any such preserved distinction between subject and object, the sublime has also been taken to insist that subject operates at the same level as—in a circuit with—those objects that make up its life-world. This was already the point of Johann Georg Hamann’s critique of Kant’s sublime, and might inform Thomas Weiskel’s more recent remark that the theoretical figure of the sublime is a complement to a psychology that stresses its own limits.41 It is also implicit in Adorno’s ideas, though this idea of being “in a circuit with” the world is different from Welsch’s “horizontality” inasmuch as the ontology of limits does not presume to do away with the subject tout court, rather to recognize that it can only exist by virtue of that which surrounds and delimits it. So, for instance, the sense in Adorno’s sublime aesthetics that the subject’s freedom is bound up with the indeterminacy of the objects that it experiences indicates the mutual dependency and interpenetration of mind and matter. Moreover, in my view this sense of a circuit of man and world is not just about an aesthetics of resistance, rather it tells us important things about the ontology that the sublime of limits, as opposed to the gesture of abstraction, emphasizes. The idea of a circuit of matter and self reminds us that in a significant sense we are out there in the world as much as we relate internally to a kind of prior notion of selfhood. This reassertion of a life-world might offer one interpretation of the topos of nature in Adorno’s writings on the sublime. The sub- lime experience is seen to bring home to man the fact of his “being bound to nature,” which Wellmer more extravagantly calls the “remembrance of na- ture in the subject.”42 Evidently Adorno wants to overturn the elevation of man above nature that Kant’s sublime enacts, but the point is that this involvement with nature is more than just a nonidentical counterpoint to man’s rational, conceptual modus operandi. Rather, in terms very similar to hermeneutical theory, it may be taken to indicate the subject’s prior involvement with the world. Martin Heidegger, for instance, makes a very similar philosophical point with recourse to the term ‘ek-sistence’ in the “Letter on Humanism.”43 (Paul Fry convincingly associates this state of ekstasis, standing outside of oneself, with the sublime.44 By contrast, Wellmer reads Adorno’s conception of the “ecstatic moment of aesthetic experience” as something quasi-religious and “not of this world,” a utopic moment that the communicative reading of Adorno’s aesthetics can correct.45) In his “Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger decries both the privileging of the subject that metaphysics has en- acted since Descartes and the concomitant sepa- ration of the world into subject and object: “The world is not an object that stands opposite us and can be looked at. [Welt ist nie ein Gegenstand, der vor uns steht und angeschaut werden kann.]”46 But in contrast to this, the definition of the self in terms of limits might be permitted to retain the categories of subject and object, but divests them of the need to be considered “substantively.” The subject and its object are not to be considered as separate and self-identical, but define and determine one another. So, for instance, the individual subject need not be taken to have a center as such, but is what it is (and not least “free”) by virtue of its interactions. Of course, radical hermeneutics’ strong sense of this kind of prior involvement is what Habermas is responding to when he sees Gadamer’s conceptions of tradition and language as closed and hegemonic.47 For Habermas these notions of the subject’s decentering and its prior involvement are in danger of banishing crucial human capacities like rational, critical ideological reflection, whereby he thinks we can intervene in such handed-down structures of understanding. His intersubjective model of rationality thinks we cannot conceive of rationality in terms of separable subjects, but in my view this is not so different from the hermeneuti- cal view that we cannot separate ourselves from our life-world. Habermas’s mistake in my view is precisely to posit the subject as straightforwardly separable from these structures: the main problems with his inter subjective ethics center on their retention of a self-identical and authoritative subject, removed from precisely the relations of conventions and habits—not to say instances of coer- cion and authority—that make ethics difficult and reflection on it necessary. In this respect Adorno’s sense that freedom depends on being “open” to the indeterminacies of the objective world might be taken as a corrective to Habermas’s more end-oriented critical reflection. This notion of “openness” is vague, and still seems somewhat beholden to an idea of the ob- ject as “immanent” and somehow “good in itself,” as well as to the conception of the world in terms of a competition between subject and object. Indeed at times Adorno seems to subscribe to the same kind of politics of immanence as Lyotard, as in his references to the notion of “das Mehr,” the surplus or supplement whose political force derives from the sense in which it evades recuperation by instrumental use or determinate meaning. But, crucially, Adorno is more reticent than Lyotard to assert this politics of supplementarity in positive, self-identical terms. For Adorno supplementarity is a necessary component in any dialectic, such as that of artistic innovation but equally that of evolution in meaning more generally, which must accommodate elements whose position and meaning have not already been mapped out. Any strict separation of this supplement from the context that gives it its freedom and its oppositional force is anathema: “the surplus is not simply the context of the elements, but an Other, mediated by that context and yet distinct from it.”48 Art’s connection to its context is clearly complicated, but it does not make sense to assert that art’s meaning is in some way “immediate,” much less that its oppositional force precisely depends on this self-sufficiency. The central concern of Adorno’s Negative Dialektik is to refute the suggestion that the dialectic can either be evaded, an evasion that would then be celebrated as a critical force “in itself,” or that it can reach an end point in positive and self-sufficient meaning. Adorno’s and Lyotard’s remarks about the Absolute are emblematic of their different ontologies. Sounding like a crude version of Kant, Lyotard is happy to refer to the sublime in terms of the possibility of a “concretisation of an objective infinity,” and as a representation of the “universal Idea.”49 Adorno by contrast takes his lead from Hegel, for whom the absolute is never positively stated, never positively appears. This is not a Heraclitean statement that the manifold phenomena of reality are always in flux, but rather an acknowledgement that, just as identity depends on reference to what it is not, nonidentity is inconceivable without identity, and more practically that no political emancipation follows necessarily from it. So while Adorno shares the same concern that man imposes meaning on the world, a concern that Lyotard addresses with the idea of “immanent matter,” for Adorno there is no easy way out: one certainly cannot simply state that certain experience is resistant to mind or indeed that all experience is in some respect thoroughly open-ended. Adorno sees meaning as a process that tends to work in the opposite direction, toward identity, characterized for example by abstractions, exclusions, and simplifications. For Adorno this means that the onus is on us to consciously oppose this tendency, albeit that this, paradoxically, can only be done with “utmost concentration.” It is symptomatic of the sublime that this non-identity can always tend toward positive statement, insofar as it is readily “absolutized,” as in Lyotard’s remark about the artwork’s immanent meaning. Rather than this self-sufficient truth, the lesson of the sublime seems to be that art’s truth or oppositional force must be cognitively experienced, and that this experience is characterized by its fragility. Adorno’s remarks in Aësthetische Theorie that the sublime is essentially dialectical, that it always readily turns into its opposite, seem to be the obvious corollary of the model of the sublime that conceives of meaning in terms of limits.50 Welsch refers likewise to the “precarious dynamic” of the sublime, underlining the brittle- ness of art’s critical or oppositional force.51

#### We must recognize that nature is valuable, and that the lives lost to nuclear power plants were lives. The way we reconcile our concept of a life requires prohibiting the production of nuclear power. I defend the resolution as a general principle, but the only coherent way to engage with questions of policy and practice within the context of the resolution is an aesthetic engagement through negative dialectics. Anything else falsely jumps to conclusions and makes rules impossible to apply, since we do not know whether the concept of the rule subsumes a specific case under it.

### Part 2

#### Experience begins with the mediation between subject and object. The necessary ground of experience entails that objects are partly known through concepts, but the object is prior in that it is not wholly reducible to concepts. Philosophy that avoids this starting point cannot generate knowledge claims.

O’Connor 4 [O’Connor, Brian (Hertford University). *Adorno’s Negative Dialectic*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. Print. pp. 56–59 // WWXR 2016-7-29] [:35]

Adorno’s strategy is to make us consider what we could be committed to in the claim that there is experience, understood as the collective name we give to our epistemic activities and our physical and temporal engagement with objects. What Adorno aims to show are two correlative claims: (i) that experience cannot be realized without external realities (objects that are irreducible to the subject’s agency, objects that are nonidentical), and (ii) that external realities have a determinative role in the context of experience. Conceived from a particular point of view, the first claim entails strictly no more than that there is matter. It does not force us to go any further than to accept the tentative Kantian conclusions of the existence of an unknowable thing-in-itself.7 Thus it might offer some kind of objec- tion to idealism, but only to idealism of an antimaterialist variety, something like an unrestricted Berkelianism. It must be shown, how- ever, that external realities are not simply indeterminate matter, and that they can be coherently understood as determining the actual content of experience—otherwise, a subjectivist account might seem viable. The possibility of such determination will allow the conclu- sion that there is not just matter as a limiting idea, but that there are objects “in the weighty sense,” to borrow Strawson’s phrase. I take this conclusion to be equivalent to showing that objects have mean- ing-bearing properties. The ultimate aim of the argument is to show the essential role of mediation in experience. Adorno’s argument may be formalized as follows: (i) It is agreed that there is experience. (ii) There must be something to which the subject relates. If this something were the subject itself, its own concepts, it would not be explained how it is that experience has an apparent externally directed rela- tion, unless an extravagant intrasubjective explanation of this struc- ture were to be proposed: “If this moment were extinguished altogether,” Adorno writes, “it would be flatly incomprehensible that a subject can know an object; the unleashed rationality would be irrational” (ND 55/45). (iii) The notion of an external relation entails that experience is the relation of the subject to something that is not purely subjective. Thus experience is a relation of subjects to nonconceptual objects. (To understood objects as being purely conceptual would be to reduce the nonconceptual dimension of their otherness.) (iv) The commitment to the notion of experience therefore entails a belief that there are objects to which the subject must necessarily relate in order to experi- ence: these objects are not reducible to concepts. This conclusion is what Adorno means by the mediated priority of the object. The claims to explain experience by those philosophies that do not understand their implicit commitment to a reduced form of object—positions with assumptions of nonconceptual immediacy between subject and object, or those with the thesis that objects conform to our categories—are compromised in that they are deprived of the relational dimension essential to the very idea of experience. It may seem that this set of claims is uncontroversial, but the background in which they are made is that of alleged reified consciousness that ultimately cannot conceive of objects that are irreducible to concepts. The strategy Adorno adopts should demonstrate two things: (i) experience entails the relation of subjects to irreducible objects; and (ii) experience involves the influence of objects. Requirement (ii) can in fact be seen as an entailment of (i). To recognize the nonconceptual dimension of objects as we experience them is to recognize their influence on our epistemic activities. The relational quality of experience is the attempt of conceptuality to map out the nonconceptual, an attempt that involves the assumption that our conceptuality is limited by the experience of the nonconceptual. The subject is related to something that is not purely subjective, and this becomes evident from the contribution made by objects to the regularity of our experience: “[I]n the extreme into which subjectivity contracts, from the point of view of that extreme’s synthetic unity, what is combined is always only what goes together anyway. Otherwise, synthesis would be nothing but arbitrary classification” (SO 755/149). That is, our knowledge- producing activities are inseparable from the determinations of things—“the determinations that make the object concrete” (ND 188/187). And for that reason our knowledge is an engagement of an object by a subject. Adorno’s actual employment of this style of critique is largely negative in that he tries to reveal the incoherence of systems that step outside this account of experience, systems that in their arrested con- dition fail to consider the contribution of the object. (This will be shown more concretely in the chapters that deal with Adorno’s cri- tiques of Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger.) Adorno claims that the notion of a nonsubjective element is implicit in all epistemic activity. Even logic requires, however minimally, material content. That is, it requires a nonsubjective referent: “Something”—as a cogitatively indispensable substrate of any concept, including the concept of Being—is the utmost abstraction of the subject- matter that is not identical with thinking, an abstraction not to be abolished by any further thought process. Without “something” there is no thinkable formal logic, and there is no way to cleanse this logic of its metalogical rudi- ment. The supposition of an absolute form, of “something at large” that might enable our thinking to shake off that subject-matter, is illusionary. Constitutive for the form of “subject-matter at large” is the substantive experience of subject-matter. (ND 139/135) This is important as it tackles the claim that logic is purely analytic and self-referential. It might be objected that logical knowledge is nothing like experience in Adorno’s sense and that his objection there- fore misses the target. Adorno’s point, however, is that since logic is the most formal expression of experience, and the means by which its coherence is measured, it must ultimately refer to the fundamental elements of experience. (This is, no doubt, a rather quaint view of the business of logic.) The object’s priority means, then, that the object is independent of the subject in the sense that it has properties that are independent of the individual subject who is attempting to understand the object: it is an irreducible particular. Subjectivity by itself cannot account for the different possibilities of experience. To deny the priority of the object—that is, to deny the mediated subject–object structure of experience—is to deprive oneself of the condition that makes any knowledge claim possible. The very notion of experience requires it. However, the reification of experience suppresses this idea. By means of this transcendental strategy Adorno attempts to demonstrate the irrationality of the reified version of experience.

#### Enlightenment thought evades its commitment to the mediated priority of the object—its attempt to know moral facts through a rational conceptual schema that reduces the objects of moral judgment to moral knowledge makes its knowledge-claims groundless. This groundlessness is the consequence of a set of historical pressures that attempts to demythologize and rationalize the world.

Bernstein 99 [Bernstein, Jay (New School). "Adorno on Disenchantment." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44:305-328 (1999) // WWXR 2016-7-29] pp. 309–310

Historically, three pressures converged to make the search for rational foundations for morality necessary and intelligible. The first pressure was the explosive emergence of natural science[‘s]. Its mathematical, quantitative depiction of the world challenged the view that ethical predicates could be descriptive. Once it was conceded, for example, that colour predicates (as exemplars of secondary qualities) do[es] not refer to anything that is mimetically like red sensory impressions and that the look of the visible is in fact a product of the action of invisible particles on our sensory apparatus, then there could be no hope that predicates like 'cruel' or 'generous' referred to real properties of worldly events like actions. Secondly, and directly continuous with this, there developed the privilege of reason-giving or theoretical justification itself. If the truth of canonical texts could be challenged by a theoretical physics resting on axiomatic first principles, there was no reason to believe the truth-claims on moral issues of canonical texts (and the traditionalist practices they supported) were any firmer. It thus became urgent to supply non-conventionally or non-traditionally backed reasons for the existence of any moral norm or practice, and ideally to propound a conception of moral truths and moral reasoning that would operate on analogy with mathematical or logical reasoning. Finally, the growth of religious, economic, and political individualism within a world in which the first two pressures were already operative stripped the last remnants of legitimacy from the belief that social roles constituted the moral substance of persons. When this new individualism was harnessed with the new rationalism of moral theory, it generated, with the backing of previous Christian thought, a demand for universalism as the 'flip-side' of individualism.4 Disenchantment (of the natural world), rationalism (the demand for theoretical justification) as the rationalisation of reason, and universalism as the flip-side of individualism converge to instigate the belief that morality could be salvaged only by a priori argumentation since, clearly, no socially constituted or factual evidence could be shown to be legitimate against these characterisations of the world and demands on reflection.5

#### There is a crisis in reason—rationality is dialectically dependent on myth to supply its content. There is no intrinsic end to which rationality can aim, since reason is not self-sufficient; reason cannot supply its own determinate end since the mediation between reasoning subject and judged object gives priority to the object, which cannot be reduced to conceptual categorization.

Bernstein 99 [Bernstein, Jay (New School). "Adorno on Disenchantment." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44:305-328 (1999) // WWXR 2016-7-29] p. 321

The dialectical entwinement of enlightenment and myth is dependent upon their mutual formation because mutual dependen- cy in sense (ii) of each: critique is always of an indeterminate con- tent. Enlightenment as the pure light of reason, whose purity is constituted through its negative self-definition, and hence in its constitution through the practice of abstract negation, needs and depends upon myth in sense (ii) as the material condition of its processive self-affirmation. Structurally, enlightenment instrumentalises the object of critique for the sake of its own self-possession and self-affirmation: each successful critical encounter further legitimates enlightenment's scepticism and rationalism. Because myth (ii) material remains material-to-be-negated, indeterminate stuff for the light of reason to shine upon, then the progressive marriage of enlightenment and myth is the dissolution of both: enlightenment into abstract, self-sufficient reason and myth into a meaningless world - events and practices as only instances of natural law. Reiterative cognitive ascent and disenchantment as demythologisa- tion are, again, the same effort of reason seen from competing per- spectives; from the perspective of reiterative cognitive ascent, enlightenment reverts to mythic stasis, e.g., the laws of pure reason, the universals of language use, the method and/or laws of natural science; from the perspective of progressive demythologisation the negativity of reason overtakes all the objects it forms along the way, including itself. Reiterative cognitive ascent progresses toward the self-sufficiency of reason in relation to any content; while sceptical demythologisation progresses toward the autonomy of the will, pure will, will to power. It is the claim to self-sufficiency of reason or will in relation to any content, the inability of enlightened reason to avow its material conditions of operation, that demonstrate that its scepticism is equally a form of irrationality. The contention that rationalised reason is intrinsically sceptical - because without an intrinsic end or purpose, and reflectively bound to dissolving its own meaning and worth - does go some of the way toward de-legitimat[es]ing 'the modern version of independent theoret- ical curiosity, utility, self-knowledge, progress in research, and so on'.20 However, the charge of scepticism by itself could, conceivably, leave enlightened reason in the aporetic predicament which Nietzsche and Weber, for instance, placed it, that is, as truly and rightfully being all the reason there is or could be and yet being self-stultifying in its operation. In giving their account of the formation of the self-sufficiency of instrumental reason through the course of its critical endeavours, Adorno and Horkheimer thus continually underline the dependence of critique on the objects it seeks to desecrate. If the objects of critique are in some weighty sense a condition of critique that reason cannot avow - they are only occasions for self-affirmation - then enlightened reason is not self-sufficient in the manner it presumes. Enlightenment depends on myth, it depends upon the entire range of anthropomorphisms (appearing objects, images, language, social practices, history, and tradition) for the possibility of enacting its sceptical reflections. Without material to negate, there can be no enlightenment; if this is neutral as an historical thesis, it is performa- tively self-defeating as a characterisation of reason as a whole. If rationalised reason is constituted essentially by the principle of imma- nence, then it cannot avow its conditionality. Enlightened reason's intrinsic claim to independence and self-sufficiency rationally pro- hibits its from acknowledging its dependency on its objects. The 'dialectic' of enlightenment is a dialectic of claimed independence and disavowed dependence; and thus in the same way in which in Hegel's version of the dialectic of independence and dependence the master, through and in virtue of his claim to absolute independence, becomes the slave of the slave, so in Adorno and Horkheimer's ratio- nality version of this dialectic enlightenment 'reverts' to myth, to mythic stasis, to the historical inertia of the master.

#### But, reason can account for its imperfect mediation of objects to concepts in two ways: either it reduces the object to the concept, and loses its ground for making knowledge-claims at all, or it identifies flaws in how its concepts capture the object and produce its features—correcting these flaws in the concepts we use to mediate the world starts with critiquing our moral concepts, like freedom and empowerment, without assuming a goal for which reason is instrumental.

O’Connor 4 [O’Connor, Brian (Hertford University). *Adorno’s Negative Dialectic*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. Print. pp. 77–81// WWXR 2016-7-29]

Perhaps the most important of Adorno’s statements on the problem of Hegelian philosophy relates to the idea of negation. For Adorno, Hegel’s concept of negation almost captures a central part of the thesis of subject-object mediation: namely, that the priority of the object means that in mediation there is both identity and non- identity (or “negativity”) between subject and object. However, Adorno argues that Hegel’s version of negation ultimately fails to capture the ambiguous nature of the subject’s relation to objects as a consequence of an assumption that even nonidentity or negation is ultimately to be considered positive. It is positive, Hegel allegedly believes, since it can be interpreted as a mode of the subject’s identity with the object. Adorno argues, however, that “[t]he non-identical is not to be obtained directly, as something positive on its part, nor is it obtainable by a negation of the negative. The negation is not an affirmation itself as it is to Hegel” (ND 161/158). The basic thesis of absolute idealism is that there can be no ultimate nonidentity between thought and object. For post-Kantian German idealism, as a rule, the idea of the thing-in-itself is irrational, and on that basis—it is argued—there is nothing with which thought is not ultimately identical. For that reason Hegel’s apparently critical moment of thought, dialectic—in which the inadequacy of the concept is evinced by its own self-contradiction (EL §81)—is prejudiced by the assumption that the object must in the end be fundamentally identical with some concept (again this being the problem, as Adorno sees it, of Hegel’s architectonic). Adorno argues that, by assuming that all possible descriptions of the subject-object relation can be reduced to identity, Hegel vitiates the realist character of the dialectic: “At each new dialectical step, Hegel goes against the intermittent insight of his own logic, forgets the rights of the preceding step, and thus prepares to copy what he chided as abstract negation: an abstract—to wit, a subjectively and arbitrarily confirmed—positivity” (ND 162/159); “The thesis that the negation of the negation is something positive can only be upheld by one who presupposes positivity—as all-conceptuality—from the beginning” (ND 162/160). Hegel’s logic, according to Adorno, attempts to “dispute away the distinction between idea and reality” (ND 329/335) and this means that the concept of dialectic in Hegel cannot be rec- onciled with the account of experience Adorno wants to defend. One might argue that these are unfair criticisms given that they are based on a presupposition about Hegel’s philosophy which Hegel himself would hardly accept. Hegel is not trying to overcome ideal- ism; rather, he seems to assume programmatically the identity of the absolute from the beginning. Thus it is inaccurate to suggest—as Adorno sometimes does—that Hegel almost understands the impli- cations of his dialectical moment. But what Adorno is saying is that Hegel’s philosophy does, at least in places, lend itself to—if not amount to—a materialist theory of experience. Yet, for Adorno, Hegel dogmatically pursues a metaphysical agenda, one that is most strongly undermined by his own materialist theses. In the following passage, for example, Adorno cites Hegel and then provides a gloss outlining how Hegel has missed the point of his own philosophy: “Truth is also positive, as knowledge coinciding with the object, but it is this self-sameness only if knowledge has reacted negatively to the Other, if it has penetrated the object and has voided the negation which it is.” The qualification of truth as a negative reaction on the part of the knowledge that penetrates the object—in other words: extinguishes the appearance of the object being directly as it is—sounds like a program of negative dialectics as knowledge “coinciding with the object.” But the establishment of this knowledge as positivity abjures that program. (ND 162–163/160) Several clarifications need to be made of this passage. First, what have positivity or negativity got to do with anything? The context of Hegel’s idealism helps make sense of this. Adorno takes Hegel’s system to be aimed at completeness, and interprets the latter as positivity inasmuch as, as the passage goes, “it has penetrated the object and has voided the negation which it is.” If experience can be, as Adorno has stipulated, “full unreduced experience in the medium of conceptual reflection” then Hegel seems to have prejudiced the outcome of an examination of the nature of experience by pinning it to a presupposed order of conceptual positivity. Hence Hegel’s system has not fully absorbed the logic of experience. Adorno is claiming that Hegel is right in so far as he argues—to put it in Adorno’s epistemological terms—that knowledge is determined by the object: knowledge coincides with the object in that sense. But Hegel is more fundamentally committed to the idea of absolute identity, and that commitment “abjures” his implicit materialism. In essence, then, Hegel’s view of experience produces a distorted picture of subjectivity in that it deprives subjectivity of the ability to discriminate—to criticize—and replaces it with the ineluctable goal of identity. The effect of this, Adorno argues, is that the experience of particularity, which is achieved in the successful dialectical thesis of the introduction to the Phenomenology, is subordinated to the needs of the system: particularity itself is lost, and instead is transformed into a philosophical version of particularity. Adorno writes: “Hegel is constantly forced to shadow-box because he shrinks from his own conception: from the dialectics of the particular, which destroyed the primacy of identity and thus, consistently, idealism itself. For the particular he substitutes the general concept of particularization pure and simple—of ‘Existenz,’ for instance, in which the particular is not any more” (ND 175/173). Indeed there is a passage in Hegel that certainly seems to say exactly what Adorno is here attributing to him. In one part of the Encyclopaedia Hegel argues that particular sensible objects are unintelligible apart from their concept, which he sees as their essence. And that cognizance of essence appears to be an activity quite other than that of the experience of particulars described in the Phenomenology: With regard to the equally immediate consciousness of the existence of external things, this is nothing else than sensible consciousness; that we have a consciousness of this kind is the least of all cognitions. All that is of interest here is to know that this immediate knowing of the being of external things is deception and error, and that there is no truth in the sensible as such, but that the being of these external things is rather something-contingent, something that passes away, or a semblance; they are essentially this: to have only an existence that is separable from their concept, or their essence. (EL §76) A grand conclusion that Adorno attempts to draw from what he sees as the problem of Hegel’s treatment of particulars is that subjectivity, too, is thereby eroded in some way. A subject which achieves identity willy-nilly is, then, an inadequate subject. This conclusion is as ironic as it is radical. Far from empowering the subject, the achievement of identity reduces the subject by depriving it of the structures that could explain its critical, negative dimension. The Phenomenology had sketched out a compelling account of the way in which the subject’s engagement with objectivity is critical. And that critical dimension is, as we have seen Adorno argue, incompatible with a system that, in essence, has the metaphysical motivation of validating the nonexperiential notion of identity.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who better performs a negative dialectical analysis in the context of the resolution.

**I’ll clarify predictable terms of art, weighing, and links to avoid ambiguity and spec debates that crowd out focus on the 1AC, but neg is reactive so it’s unreciprocal for me to meet an exhaustive burden. Lastly, CX checks all neg theory violations. I will make concessions given the stipulations above. To clarify:**

#### Negative Dialectics is an aesthetic thought process which consists in identifying a concept such as the idea of a life, explaining how that concept is misapplied, and altering our perception of that concept through exposing us to performances that break us out of our prior conceptions. That means, vote for the debater who identifies a way in which a moral concept operative in society today is misapplied, and reworks that concept without reducing the difference of the people and situations to which it applies. The 1AC is a performance of negative dialectics, so you cannot PIK out of my speech act.

### Underview

#### 1. T and theory are RVIs for the aff on counter-interps with competing interps since they’re 100% nonreciprocal – can’t read T in the 1ar and 1ar theory forces me to underinvest on substance, leading to an easy 2n collapse from which I cannot recover.

#### 2. If T and theory are not an RVI for the aff, then drop the arg and re-evaluate on neg T and neg theory—best for education because we bring the debate back to substance and best for fairness because I’m always open to T or theory on both sides of every issue so it’s a no risk issue for the neg since you have no topicality burden.

#### 3. Aff gets reasonability - no interp is perfect since there’s always a slight modification to a topical rule on debate which outweighs since competing interps means I can never choose an interp.

#### Even if my aff is slightly unfair that’s justified since I need the ability to frame the debate and establish constructive ground, which outweighs judge intervention since I can’t even read an aff to begin with if competing interps is true.

#### 4. If the neg drops an AC argument that interacts with some argument in the NC, the argument from the AC wins since you have the first opportunity and 13 minutes to explain the interaction, whereas I only have 7.

#### Additionally, prefer my role of the ballot because reworking our subjectivities and moral concepts to avoid appealing to a moral value absent self-reflection is necessary to prevent the conditions of possibility of atrocities.

Adorno 98 [Adorno, Theodor W. (1998) ‘Education after Auschwitz’, in his *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, Columbia University Press, New York. // WWXR 2016-8-4]

The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again. Its priority before any other requirement is such that I believe I need not and should not justify it. I cannot understand why it has been given so little concern until now. To justify it would be monstrous in the face of the monstrosity that took place. Yet the fact that one is so barely conscious of this demand and the questions it raises shows that the monstrosity has not penetrated people’s minds deeply, itself a symptom of the continuing potential for its recurrence as far as peoples’ conscious and unconscious is concerned. Every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential compared to this single ideal: never again Auschwitz. It was the barbarism all education strives against. One speaks of the threat of a relapse into barbarism. But it is not a threat—Auschwitz was this relapse, and barbarism continues as long as the fundamental conditions that favored that relapse continue largely unchanged. That is the whole horror. The societal pressure still bears down, although the danger remains invisible nowadays. It drives people toward the unspeakable, which culminated on a world-historical scale in Auschwitz. Among the insights of Freud that truly extend even into culture and sociology, one of the most profound seems to me to be that civilization itself produces anti-civilization and increasingly reinforces it. His writings Civilization and its Discontents and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego deserve the widest possible diffusion, especially in connection with Auschwitz.1 If barbarism itself is inscribed within the principle of civilization, then there is something desperate in the attempt to rise up against it. Any reflection on the means to prevent the recurrence of Auschwitz is darkened by the thought that this desperation must be made conscious to people, lest they give way to idealistic platitudes. Nevertheless the attempt must be made, even in the face of the fact that the fundamental structure of society, and thereby its members who have made it so, are the same today as twenty-five years ago. Millions of innocent people—to quote or haggle over the numbers is already inhumane—were systematically murdered. That cannot be dismissed by any living person as a superficial phenomenon, as an aberra- tion of the course of history to be disregarded when compared to the great dynamic of progress, of enlightenment, of the supposed growth of humanitarianism. The fact that it happened is itself the expression of an extremely powerful societal tendency. Here I would like to refer to a fact that, very characteristically, seems to be hardly known in Germany, although it furnished the material for a best-seller like The Forty Days of Musa Dagh by Werfel.2 Already in the First World War the Turks—the so-called “Young Turk Movement” under the leadership of Enver Pascha and Talaat Pascha—murdered well over a million Armenians. The highest German military and government authori- ties apparently were aware of this but kept it strictly secret. Genocide has its roots in this resurrection of aggressive nationalism that has developed in many countries since the end of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, one cannot dismiss the thought that the invention of the atomic bomb, which can obliterate hundreds of thousands of people literally in one blow, belongs in the same historical context as genocide. The rapid population growth of today is called a population explosion; it seems as though historical destiny responded by readying counter-explosions, the killing of whole populations. This only to intimate how much the forces against which one must act are those of the course of world history. Since the possibility of changing the objective—namely societal and political—conditions is extremely limited today, attempts to work against the repetition of Auschwitz are necessarily restricted to the subjective dimension. By this I also mean essentially the psychology of people who do such things. I do not believe it would help much to appeal to eternal values, at which the very people who are prone to commit such atrocities would merely shrug their shoulders. I also do not believe that enlightenment about the positive qualities possessed by persecuted minorities would be of much use. The roots must be sought in the persecutors, not in the victims who are murdered under the paltriest of pretenses. What is necessary is what I once in this respect called the turn to the subject. One must come to know the mechanisms that render people capable of such deeds, must reveal these mechanisms to them, and strive, by awakening a general awareness of those mechanisms, to prevent people from becoming so again. It is not the victims who are guilty, not even in the sophistic and caricatured sense in which still today many like to construe it. Only those who unreflectingly vented their hate and aggression upon them are guilty. One must labor against this lack of reflection, must dissuad[ing]e people from striking outward without reflecting upon themselves. The only education that has any sense at all is an education toward critical self-reflection. But since according to the findings of depth psychology, all personalities, even those who commit atrocities in later life, are formed in early childhood, education seeking to prevent the repetition must concentrate upon early childhood. I mentioned Freud’s thesis on discontent in culture. Yet the phenomenon extends even further than he understood it, above all, because the pressure of civilization he had observed has in the meantime multiplied to an unbearable degree. At the same time the explosive tendencies he first drew attention to have assumed a violence he could hardly have foreseen. The discontent in culture, however, also has its social dimension, which Freud did not overlook though he did not explore it concretely. One can speak of the claustrophobia of humanity in the administered world, of a feeling of being incarcerated in a thoroughly societalized, closely woven, netlike environment. The denser the weave, the more one wants to escape it, whereas it is precisely its close weave that prevents any escape. This intensifies the fury against civilization. The revolt against it is violent and irrational.